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In this postcolonial age, it is common to expect indigenous people to glorify the 
moments of decolonization and condemn previous colonial regimes in the name of 
nationalism.  This logic follows from the general experience and belief that colonial-
ism is inherently bad and humiliating.  The government of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) adopted a similar narrative in the 1980s and applied it to the former col-
ony of Hong Kong, promoting the idea that fellow countrymen (tongbao) from the col-
ony should embrace the nation/homeland (zuguo) when they were ﬁnally able to free 
themselves from the shackles of colonialism.
However, at the same time that this celebratory narrative prevailed in ofﬁcial an-
nouncements and patriotic discourses in mainland China, a darker narrative emerged 
from popular media.  Ever since Hong Kong’s return to China was decided in 1984, 
foreign reports have expressed fears of political restrictions after 1997 by emphasizing 
the PRC’s poor human rights records and reminding the public of the miserable fate 
of the political dissidents during and after the notorious Tiananmen incident of 1989. 
These stories portray the handover of Hong Kong to China as a re-subordination of 
the local people to another, perhaps more evil, empire.  Unlike the conventional nar-
rative of decolonization, which associates nationalism with liberation of the people, in 
this anti-PRC narrative nationalism implies political censorship and total submission 
of the individual to the governing state.  In both narratives, however, the nation is un-
derstood to be equivalent to the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
For the local people of Hong Kong, nationalism is a relatively new vocabulary.  In 
the 1940s and 1950s, many migrants who escaped from the war with Japan and later 
from persecution by the CCP ﬂed to Hong Kong.  A large number of such migrants 
then settled in Hong Kong because they felt that it was a place where they could retain 
their wealth without being whirled into the politics of the mainland.  To these early 
immigrants and their children, the nation of China signiﬁed chaos and deprivation. 
Hong Kong textbooks and government documents ﬁrst referred to them as refugees. 
This description stresses their experience of temporary status in Hong Kong.  Begin-
ning in the 1970s, subsequent to their economic success and accumulation of wealth, 
these Hong Kong residents started to develop a strong local identity as “Hong 
Kongers” distinctive from both Britain and China.  Hong Kong represented a place 
where they could afford to pursue dreams of getting rich and to forget about politics. 
It was not until the 1980s when the Sino-British declaration sealed the fate of Hong 
Kong that these Hong Kong residents had to face the reality that Hong Kong could no 
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longer be a permanent political refuge and that they had to reestablish their bonds 
with their nation/homeland (zuguo) again.
Hong Kong provides an interesting case study for postcolonial society.  Many critics 
have argued that decolonization was only a transfer of ownership and did not grant 
the population sovereignty.  Regardless of whether this statement is true or not, the 
experience of colonialism has provided space for the local population to articulate 
their differentiation between the homeland and the political entity controlled by the 
CCP, and to express alternative imaginings of “citizenship,” which includes the “oth-
ering” of their nation/homeland (zuguo) for its lag in progress compared to the city.  To 
some extent, Hong Kongers’ sense of belonging as Chinese (Zhongguoren) has increased 
since the 1990s.  Nevertheless, they continue to be harsh critics of the mainland gov-
ernment and maintain a sense of superiority, of being a different kind of Chinese. 
Hong Kongers’ imaginings of the mainland and their critical attitudes toward it pres-
ent a challenge to the integrity of the concept of “China” and the meaning of being a 
“citizen of China” (Zhongguo gongmin).
This essay analyzes how the nation has been represented in history textbooks and 
popular discourses in Hong Kong since the 1980s, when Hong Kong’s retrocession 
was decided.  It takes up the historical interpretations of 20th century China and Hong 
Kong in several secondary school history textbooks since the late 1980s, using exam-
ples drawn from three Chinese History textbooks and one History textbook.  In the 
last part of this essay, I will explore how Hong Kongers born in the 1970s who have 
received secondary school history education in Hong Kong view China and their rela-
tionships with the nation after the return of Hong Kong to China.
I.  Chinese History Textbooks
Hong Kong’s secondary school curriculum consists of two separate subjects: “Histo-
ry” and “Chinese History.” 1)  According to Flora Kan and Edward Vickers, two schol-
ars of Hong Kong secondary school history education, the division between the two 
subjects can be seen as partly as “a consequence of the predominance of English as 
the medium of instruction in local schools,” and partly “the result of a desire on the 
part of Hong Kong’s colonial administration to conciliate local nationalist sentiment.” 
Before the retrocession, more than half of the secondary schools in Hong Kong were 
Anglo-Chinese schools in which all subjects were taught in English except for Chinese 
language and Chinese History.  Chinese history was separated out of the History sub-
ject because it would make more sense to Chinese students to learn it in Chinese. 
Moreover, in the 1950s the colonial government felt that bringing Chinese history in 
the ofﬁcial curriculum could provide a more objective viewpoint offer an alternative 
to the anti-British and Communist elements that featured prominently in mainland 
textbooks.2)  Although after 1997 many Anglo-Chinese schools began to change to 
Chinese as the main language of instruction, the division between the two history sub-
jects remains.
In some schools, Chinese History is a mandatory subject in lower-forms, from Form 
1 (seventh grade) to Form 3 (ninth grade).  The curriculum is organized chronological-
ly, from antiquity to the present.  Twentieth-century is usually covered in Form 3, after 
students learned the dynastic history in Form 1 and Form 2.  When the students enter 
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upper-forms (Form 4 and Form 5), a vast majority of them focus either on arts (wenke) 
or science (like).  In order to graduate from secondary school, students have to take a 
standardized Hong Kong Certiﬁcate of Education Examination (HKCEE) in Form 5. 
Chinese History is one of the elective arts subjects for these upper-form students.  The 
students who choose Chinese History as one of their elective subjects encounter twen-
tieth century China a second time in Form 5.  The textbooks for the Form 5 level stu-
dents are more comprehensive and follow the examination syllabus guidelines put out 
by the Curriculum Development Committee of the Education Department set up in 
1972.  In theory, though, the curriculum for the lower forms is very similar to the one 
for the upper forms.
In this section, I will focus on three Chinese History textbooks published in the 
1980s and the 2000s: (1) Xinbian Zhongguo Lishi (1984) published by Ren Ren and Ling 
Kee Publishing Company, which was one of the most popular textbooks used among 
lower-form students in the 1980s; (2) Tanjiu Zhongguo Lishi (2004) published by Man-
hattan Press; and (3) Tansuo Zhongguoshi (2006) published by Ling Kee Publishing 
Company.  The latter two are Form 5 textbooks used by secondary schools today.  In 
the comparison of their treatment of the concept of nation, I will concentrate on three 
aspects—the mission statements, the descriptions of the “War of Resistance” (World 
War II/the Paciﬁc War) and the depiction of Hong Kong.
A.  Objectives
As Kan and Vickers have argued, the colonial situation of Hong Kong is peculiar in 
that the colonizers did not try to instill a sense of British superiority among the colo-
nized population, because they were not ready to build a politicized sense of local or 
British belonging, and because they were afraid of angering the Chinese government.3) 
Bernard Luk, who has done research on the postwar curriculum of Chinese Studies in 
Hong Kong, shows that in the 1950s, the Education Department of the Hong Kong 
government appointed a Committee on Chinese Studies to review the pedagogic ap-
proaches to the teaching of Chinese language, literature, culture and history.  The 
committee strongly “identiﬁed moral education as one of the major needs” of educa-
tion in Hong Kong.4)  As evidenced in Chinese History textbooks from the 1950s to 
the 1980s, one of the main themes in history textbooks was the moral assessment of 
political leaders in dynastic history.  Another factor contributing to the concentration 
on dynastic history was the political turbulence in the Mainland since the end of 
World War II.  The Education Department was not ready to deal with such controver-
sies in its curricula.
Qian Mu, a history scholar who migrated from China and served as the principal of 
the New Asia College (which later became a college of the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong), was one of the ﬁrst Chinese History textbook authors.  He authored and 
edited Xinbian Zhongguo Lishi (published in 1984) with his student, Sun Guodong, who 
later became a renowned historian himself.  According to historian Lin Xiaoqing, 
Qian “used history to build a greater identiﬁcation between his personal experience 
and historical moral experiences.” 5)  His belief in the discipline of history as a form of 
moral training for individuals is reﬂected in the textbook.  The preface of Xinbian 
Zhongguo Lishi (hereafter as Xinbian) states, “the objective of Chinese history education 
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is to point out the ﬂaws and merits of politicians so that students can learn to cultivate 
themselves.” 6)  In Xinbian, the authors further argue that Chinese History is where one 
can ﬁnd “successes, failures, gains and losses” in events, “wisdom, stupidity, honesty 
and debauchery” in people, and “stability, chaos, prosperity and degeneration” in re-
gimes.  The role of history teachers is to analyze and point out these changes, so that 
“learners can broaden their knowledge” (zhang jianshi ) and “improve their spiritual be-
ing” (zheng xiu yang ).  To these scholars as well as to the publishers of Xinbian, the big-
gest function of Chinese history education was to help individuals to become better 
moral beings through learning about the past.  Nevertheless, the concepts of the na-
tion (guojia) or citizenship (guomin/gongmin) were not mentioned.
As the return of Hong Kong was decided, the task of reconstructing a nationalistic 
history of China and Hong Kong became an urgent political and cultural task for the 
postcolonial Hong Kong government.  In the 1990s when the return of Hong Kong 
came closer, some patriotic framers of Chinese History education felt that Hong 
Kongers’ love for the nation should not be restricted to “culture” and thus proposed 
that Chinese history education be politicized.  Ever since, identifying one’s Chinese-
ness as cultural or ethnic heritage became insufﬁcient for the larger political agenda. 
In secondary school Chinese history textbooks, we see a change in the contents, with 
heavier emphasis on learners’ sense of belonging to the PRC and more details of the 
achievements of leaders in the Communist Party.  However, this inculcation of love 
for the nation was only partially successful.
Unlike earlier Chinese history textbooks authored or co-authored by one or two re-
nowned scholars in the ﬁeld, the textbooks published in the 2000s were put out by 
committees.7)  Tanjiu Zhongguo Lishi (hereafter Tanjiu) published by Manhattan Press in 
2004 adheres closely to the “one-China” principle in its objectives.  It states in the 
Preface: “History education not only functions to guide students to learn about the na-
tion’s history and culture, so that they can develop a sense of identiﬁcation (rentong 
gan) and belonging (guishugan), it also should [help students] cultivate the skills of 
thinking and self-learning, so that they can become lifetime active learners and nation-
al citizens (guomin) equipped with analytical skills.  After the handover of Hong Kong 
to China, Chinese History has important meanings in cultivating young people’s rec-
ognition of their national citizen’s identity (rentong guomin shenfen).” 8)
In contrast to Xinbian Zhongguo Lishi published in the 1980s which associates the 
study of Chinese history with the development of an individual sense of moral judg-
ment, in Tanjiu the objective of history education is to cultivate one to be a “responsi-
ble national citizen” (guomin) of the nation.  Another Form 5 level Chinese history 
textbook, Tansuo Zhongguoshi (hereafter Tansuo), published by Ling Kee in 2006, echoes 
this theme.  The authors quote from Guoshi Dagang, a prominent history textbook pub-
lished by Qian Mu: “A national citizen (guomin) who claims to be more educated than 
average people should have some knowledge of his/her country’s history, and should 
maintain a kind of humanistic feeling (wenqing) and respect.”  Then, it continues with 
the authors’ own words: “this new curriculum also emphasizes that students should in-
crease their understanding of the nation’s circumstances (guoqing ), and through which 
they can develop national/ethnic feelings (minzu qinghuai ) and cultural belonging, as 
well as become responsible citizens (gongmin).” 9)  This kind of mission statement 
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placed in the front pages of the new textbooks conforms to Vickers’s comments on the 
use of nationalistic history education, which is to be “pressed into service by politi-
cians and scholars to bolster or, sometimes, to invent a national identity for the inhab-
itants of their states, and to foster among their population a sense of patriotic loyal-
ty.” 10)  In these textbooks, the nation (guojia) and belonging (rentong) are consistently 
emphasized.  Both generations of textbooks focus on political history and represent 
China as a continuous homogenous civilization, but while in the 1980s history educa-
tion is regarded as a form of moral training for the individual, in the 2000s the empha-
sis shifts to responsibility and citizenship.11)  The change coincides with the amend-
ments the Curriculum Development Committee made in the 1997 curriculum guide 
for Chinese History, which states that the aim of history is to “build a sense of belong-
ing to China and the Chinese race.” 12)  They also exemplify how the Hong Kong gov-
ernment used the Chinese history curriculum to promote patriotic feelings after 1997.
B.  Depictions of the War of Resistance (World War II)
The War of Resistance has always been depicted as a heroic defense against the in-
vasion of the evil empire of Japan.  In both generations of textbooks, the complexity 
within and between state and society is never interrogated.  “Japan” only appears to 
represent actions committed by the military, and other dimensions of war, such as the 
conditions of the homefront, anti-war discourses and the cultural effects of warfare, are 
not included.
In Xinbian, the reasons for Japan to go to war are reduced to the greed and jealousy 
of the Japanese.  The authors contend that these character ﬂaws can be traced back to 
the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905 or even further: “After [the Japanese] won Rus-
sia, they immediately wanted to swallow (tunping) China’s Northeast.  After the suc-
cess of the Northern expedition [in China to drive out the warlords], Japan was more 
jealous ( jizhi ) of China and invaded the Northeast.” 13)  Besides the general character 
ﬂaws of the “nation” of Japan, no other reasons and backgrounds were given for their 
intention of going to war and the rise of the militaristic state.
In Tanjiu, the authors explain that the reason for Japan’s ambition to expand was 
partly a result of its lack of resources and disadvantages in geography.  The textbook 
also brieﬂy describes the increase of population and industrialization in the late nine-
teenth century which prompted Japan to develop international markets and search for 
raw materials.  Because China had plenty of resources, it became the target of Japan. 
In its narrative, since the late nineteenth century, after the modernization of the Meiji 
period, Japan had already begun its aggression towards China: “In the ﬁrst Sino-Japa-
nese War ended in 1895, Japan occupied Taiwan, and controlled the southern part of 
Manchuria and swallowed Korea.  These military victories strengthened Japan’s ambi-
tion.”  Later, the militaristic ofﬁcials who promoted the idea of conquering China 
gained power after the world depression, which badly affected Japan.14)
In Tansuo, the “background of Japan’s invasion of China” reads as follows: “As early 
as the Sino-Japanese War, Japan already occupied Taiwan.  After the First World War 
in 1914, Japan further occupied Shandong.  And until the 1930s, Japan continued to 
invade China …”  The authors mention that Japan faced the internal problems of eco-
nomic depression and unemployment in the 1920s and 1930s, but also highlight the 
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“ambition” (yexin) and “jealousy” ( jizhi ) of Japan.  As in the other textbooks, the au-
thors also depict Japan as watching over China, trying to use it as a stepping-stone for 
conquering (zhengfu) the world.  When China’s power started to grow, it tried to pre-
vent China from unifying by taking advantage of the chaotic state during the split be-
tween the Nationalists and the Communists.15)
Comparing the two generations of textbooks, the depictions of Japan’s aggressive 
“character” are similar, but the later textbooks also pay more attention to economic 
factors and the rise of militarism, underlining the growth of state power of Japan be-
ginning in the late nineteenth century.  However, none of the versions differentiates 
the Japanese military state from the people.  Even in Tanjiu and Tansuo, the nation of 
Japan is depicted as one entity with uniﬁed sentiments.  By attributing human charac-
teristics to a nation and not including alternative voices in the history textbooks, the 
authors mislead students into thinking that the nation is representative of the people 
and oversimplify the concepts of nation and agency.
As for the events of the war, Tanjiu has a summary at the beginning.  “In 1895, Ja-
pan occupied Taiwan, and then it stepped into Northeast, Shandong and Inner Mon-
golia.  In 1931, they [the Japanese] used the excuse of the “918” incident to invade the 
three provinces in the Northeast and set up a puppet state of Manchukuo.16)  Following 
that, they began to further swallow Northern China.” 17)  The selection of events indi-
cates that the rise of Japanese militarism can be traced back to the Russo-Japanese war 
and the annexation of Taiwan in 1905.  Even though there was a gap of twenty-six 
years, these events at the turn of the century are portrayed as almost immediate prece-
dents of Japanese aggression in the 1930s.
Furthermore, the chronology of the Sino-Japanese war (and World War II) in all 
three textbooks begins with several attacks made by Japan beginning in 1931, includ-
ing the occupation of Manchukuo and the incidents of “918”, “128” 18) and “77” 19). 
The use of dates to represent war incidents or battles serves as easy reminders for later 
generations to commemorate these incidents of heroic resistance and thus mobilize 
nationalistic sentiments.  Today, some of these dates are marked on the ofﬁcial calen-
dar for people to celebrate China’s “victory” in the War of Resistance.  This type of 
narrative and gloriﬁcation of resistance evidences the importation of the standard PRC 
interpretation into Hong Kong textbooks.
The descriptions of these early events in the textbooks lead to the argument that 
China was forced to join the war as a reaction to the immoral acts of Japan.  In Tanjiu, 
the authors state, “In July, 1931, the Chinese farmers and the Korean farmers started a 
conﬂict in Wanbaoshan, Changchun, because of water supply.  Japan, using the excuse 
of protecting its migrants, ordered the shooting of Chinese farmers, and led to the 
death of hundreds of people.”  In the next paragraph, the section describing the “918” 
incident states, “On September 18, 1931, the Kanto Army of Japan bombarded a sec-
tion of the South Manchurian Railway near Liu Tiao Hu in Shenyang, and blamed it 
on the Chinese army.  Using this as an excuse, it invaded Shenyang.” 20)  The “128” in-
cident is also described as an event instigated by the Japanese.  The authors contend, 
“In January 1932, Japanese monks burned a factory after a conﬂict with Chinese work-
ers in Shanghai, and the Japanese consulate used the excuse that the monks were as-
saulted and sent out an ultimatum to the Shanghai Municipal government …”  Despite 
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the compliance of the Shanghai government with the demands, according to the au-
thors, the Japanese army still bombarded Zhabei and Wusong.  All these descriptions 
are one-sided and portray Japan as unreasonable and vicious in character, fabricating 
excuses to invade China.  At the same time, the descriptions turn China into a passive 
victim in the ﬁrst stage of the war.21)
However, in all Chinese History textbooks, the image of Chinese soldiers as coura-
geous resisters became more prevalent after the war ofﬁcially began.  The Chinese 
people consistently appear as brave soldiers holding out for a long time or ﬁghting off 
their enemies despite challenging circumstances.  In Tanjiu, the authors repeated praise 
the Chinese people’s perseverance (yili ) and determination ( juexin) in the war.22)  After 
its account of the “Nanjing Massacre,” where the authors report that 300,000 Chinese 
died in six weeks and that many innocent people were looted, raped and killed, they 
exclaim, “The Japanese army use brutal tactics to harm the Chinese common people, 
hoping that this would undermine the morals of the [Chinese] army and people so 
that China would surrender soon after, but in fact it solidiﬁed the determination of our 
nation’s people (guoren) to resist.” 23)  The authors imply that such atrocities were no 
doubt deliberate acts of the entire Japanese army to induce China to surrender.  They 
also shape the narrative of the incident so that it ﬁts well into the overall patriotic de-
scription of the Chinese, even though there is no evidence that the majority of the 
Chinese people were aware of the incident and were motivated by it.
In both generations of textbooks, the description of the Sino-Japanese war ends 
with a gloriﬁcation of Chinese victory, with little mention of the Allies or the war in 
Europe.  In Xinbian, although the authors do not give reasons for China’s victory, they 
praise highly the bravery of the Chinese troops ﬁghting in a disadvantaged environ-
ment.  Moreover, they state that because of China’s “performance and bravery in the 
war,” the international world became “greatly impressed with China and gained a 
“new understanding of the ‘Chinese people’ (Zhonguo minzu).” 24)  As a result, the un-
equal treaties were revoked.  This also represented the end of the era of humiliation.
Tanjiu differs subtly in these descriptions of the victory.  China’s “victory” is attrib-
uted to (1) The unity of all people (guomin) and their determination to resist; (2) the 
United Front and the willingness of the Nationalists and Communists to put aside their 
hostility; (3) the strategy of prolonging the war—trading space for time; (4) the advan-
tage of China’s size; and lastly (5) the help received from the allies.25)  In Tansuo, the 
reasons were almost identical to Tanjiu except for the fourth reason.  Instead of high-
lighting the large size of China, it focuses on the limitations of Japan, including its lack 
of soldiers, resources, and the long distance of traveling required of the Japanese to 
ﬁght on.26)
In both generations of textbooks perseverance, unity, bravery and wisdom of the 
Chinese people are listed as the keys to the nation’s survival.  The allies’ role is only 
supplementary in the victory and the battles in Europe are not mentioned at all.  War 
is legitimized as an instance of national heroism.  Moreover, the War of Resistance is 
described as instrumental for China to boost its international image.  But there is a 
slight difference between the accounts of the 1980s and 2000s.  In Xinbian, the victory 
was attributed to the superiority of the Chinese nation/race (minzu), but in the new 
textbooks, the unity of the citizens (guomin) and the willingness of party leaders to put 
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away differences are seen as the primary reason for the victory.
Overall, all three textbooks oversimplify agency and interpret the Sino-Japanese 
war as one of oppression.  The conceptualization of the enemy is exploited to make 
the victimized and gloriﬁed images of China stand out.  The images of China and Ja-
pan are inscribed in the dichotomy of us and other, and victim/victimizer in the lan-
guage.  The victimization of the Chinese began with Western aggression and imperial-
ism and ended with Japanese invasion and Chinese’s victory in resisting it.  In Tanjiu 
and Tansuo, the authors further reduce the history of war to the spheres of nationalist 
conﬂicts and justice.  The earlier reference to China’s victimhood in recounting the 
war suggests the nationalistic co-optation of the war to symbolize China as the wound-
ed nation.  And as in all moral tales, in the end, it is the “hero” who perseveres and 
wins.
C.  Hong Kong
In the overall narrative of Chinese History textbooks used today, the beginning of 
Western aggression witnessed the takeover of Hong Kong territories by the British af-
ter the Opium War.  The return of Hong Kong represents a watershed that put an end 
to the history of humiliation.  However, Hong Kong is a non-existing entity in Xinbian 
and other textbooks published in the 1980s.  No reference to Hong Kong can be 
found.
It was not until 1997 that Hong Kong history was integrated into Chinese History 
textbooks.  The retrocession of Hong Kong and the increasing interests in local identi-
ty and history among the general public probably pushed the Curriculum Develop-
ment Committee to consider the inclusion of Hong Kong history in the Chinese His-
tory curriculum.  Nevertheless, as Flora Kan points out, Hong Kong history is usually 
“treated as peripheral to Chinese History, and merely serves to enhance students’ in-
terest and give them a sense of the relevance of Chinese History.” 27)  In the textbooks, 
the contents dealing with Hong Kong are still negligible.  Hong Kong is intertwined 
with narratives of wars and politics, and students are encouraged to imagine them-
selves as citizens of mainland China.  The only inclusions are in the last part of the 
textbooks, which narrate the signing of the Sino-British declaration and the retroces-
sion of Hong Kong.  A similar treatment is given to the retrocession of Macau.28)  In-
corporating the “return” of Hong Kong and Macau in the last chapter symbolizes the 
grand ﬁnale of twentieth-century Chinese history.  By excluding any other parts of 
Hong Kong history, these textbooks authors also help construct a monolithic discourse 
of China through their silence about internal tensions and local histories.
II.  History Subject Textbooks
While a harmonious “China” is emphasized in most Chinese History textbooks, 
capitalist development is the grand narrative in History textbooks.  The History cur-
riculum, which focuses on world history, is generally taught in English.29)  In the 
1990s, the History subject began to incorporate local history and recent history not 
dealt with ever before.  Form 1 to Form 3 focus on a general education of history from 
antiquity to contemporary history.  Form 4 and Form 5 are devoted to Asian History 
and World History in the 20th century respectively.30)  Like the Chinese History sub-
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ject, History textbooks also attempt to construct the history of Hong Kong as a homo-
geneous, progressive discourse through the erasure of certain histories, but in opposite 
ways.  While the Chinese History textbooks exclude Hong Kong till its retrocession, 
the narrative of Hong Kong history is told as a linear progression from a ﬁshing village 
to an international prosperous city.  Critiques of capitalism and urbanity, and themes 
such as exploitation, unequal distribution of wealth and rural everyday life, are si-
lenced in this historical narrative.
Journey Through History: A Modern Course, published by Aristo Educational Press in 
2000, is one of the most popular English textbooks taught in lower-form History class-
es.  It consists of three books, which are devoted to Ancient and Medieval Times, 
Transition to Modern Times, and Twentieth Century respectively.  In the following, I 
focus on Book 3, which has four chapters: “International Conﬂicts and Threats to 
Peace in the 20th Century,” “Growth and Development of Hong Kong in the 20th Cen-
tury,” “Major Achievements in the 20th Century,” and “Mini-Research on an Aspect of 
20th Century.”  The author, Nelson Chan, has a Bachelor of Arts degree and Certiﬁca-
tion in Education from the University of Hong Kong.
A.  Japan and World War II
Although the portrayal of Japan as an aggressive nation in History textbooks is sim-
ilar to Chinese History textbooks, victimization and suffering of the Chinese people 
are not highlighted.  Chan introduces twentieth-century Japan as follows:
Party rule began in Japan in 1918.  Yet there was not such a tradition in Japan. 
Many party leaders were corrupt … Many Japanese supported the army and 
navy chiefs.  These people said that expansion could solve the problems facing 
Japan.  They also stated that Japan should build strong armed forces and adopt 
expansionist policies to strengthen Japan’s position in the world.  We call them 
militarists, and their idea militarism.  In 1931, the militarists sent an army to at-
tack Manchuria in China and took it in 1932.  Their power rose.  The militarists 
ended party rule and ruled Japan during 1932–1945.31)
No elaborations were given as to what problems Japan was facing in the early twen-
tieth century.  The text also implies that “many Japanese” were in favor of expansion 
and supported “militarism.”  This treatment of Japan as a nation is quite similar to that 
in the Chinese History textbooks.
One chapter is devoted to the history of Hong Kong, entitled, “Growth and Devel-
opment of Hong Kong in the 20th century.”  It begins with the statement that begin-
ning paragraph, it states, “Under British rule, Hong Kong developed into an entrepot 
in around 1900, and then it continued to grow in the early 20th century.” 32)  Then, it 
jumps to a section called “The Japanese Occupation (1941–1945).”  There are four 
subsections: The ﬁrst one is “How Japan occupied Hong Kong.”  The larger picture of 
China is not described.  The description of the Sino-Japanese War, which resides in 
the chapter, “International Conﬂicts and Threats to Peace in the 20th century.”  It be-
gins with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which occurred on the same day as its 
invasion of Hong Kong: “Japanese soldiers started to attack Hong Kong on December 
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8, 1941.  In eighteen days, Hong Kong fell.  From Christmas Day, Japan ruled over 
Hong Kong.”  The next subsection is “Life Under Japanese Occupation” which brieﬂy 
highlights four topics: food rationing during wartime, forced repatriation [of Hong 
Kong residents] to China, issuing of military notes, and Japanization of Hong Kong.33) 
The length of each topic is less than four descriptive sentences, with no analysis.  The 
general depiction is that Hong Kong people suffered much during and after the war. 
None of these aspects is mentioned in Chinese History textbooks, where there is noth-
ing about Hong Kong in this period and very little about civilians.
Unlike the Chinese History textbooks, this textbook does not mention Chinese peo-
ple’s heroic role in the war.  Instead, the third subsection, “End of Japanese Occupa-
tion,” starts with, “On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima and then another one on Nagasaki three days later.  Japan ﬁnally surren-
dered.  This ended Japan’s occupation of Hong Kong.”  This interpretation is in stark 
contrast to Chinese History textbooks, which depict the role of the Americans and the 
Allies in the “victory” of the war as supplementary to Chinese people’s bravery, perse-
verance and unity.  The United States’ intervention is described here as the only rea-
son for how the war ended.  This explanation in Journey aligns more closely with histo-
ry textbooks published in Britain or the United States than the Chinese History 
textbooks in Hong Kong.  Moreover, it does not use the term the “War of Resistance” 
in the text.  In fact, the chapter only refers the Paciﬁc War as “Japan’s occupation,” 
and “Second World War” is only used earlier in other chapters to refer to the Europe-
an side of the war.
The section on the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong concludes with “Effects of 
Japanese Occupation,” which states, “Hong Kong people had a hard life.  Thousands 
of them died of starvation and many of them were forced to leave Hong Kong.” 
Moreover, the text continues, many Hong Kong people lost money because they were 
forced to exchange their money for military notes but could not redeem the money af-
ter the war.34)  This is also is a narrative of victimization, but unlike the Chinese Histo-
ry textbooks, there is almost no mention of these Hong Kongers being Chinese.  Chi-
na is entirely absent in this narrative of war.  The author chooses to take a Hong 
Kong-centered perspective on the issue of World War II.
B.  Postwar Development in Hong Kong
The following section, “Hong Kong’s Growth and Development since 1945,” gives 
a summary of Hong Kong’s transition from an entrepot to a manufacturing center, and 
ﬁnally to an international ﬁnancial center, with one and a half page of text accompa-
nied by illustrations.  Two main factors that “helped Hong Kong develop into a manu-
facturing center” in the 1950s were the Chinese civil war, which induced people to 
migrate to Hong Kong with “capital” and “technical knowledge,” along with others 
who were “willing to work for low wages”; and the Korean War, during which Britain 
forbade Hong Kong to trade with China and thus forced Hong Kong to industrialize. 
Besides these brief mentions, there is nothing about the PRC or the British govern-
ment in this section.  No details are given about the wars aside from their positive 
inﬂuence on Hong Kong’s economy.
The textbook then states that in the 1970s, because of competition from industries 
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in Singapore, Taiwan and Korea, rising production costs and restrictions on trade, 
Hong Kong had to adapt to the new circumstances and turn itself into an international 
ﬁnancial center.  This section also lists the main categories of Hong Kong’s “social de-
velopments” during the 1950s to 1980s, which were education, housing and social wel-
fare.  The social problems and political turmoil in Hong Kong during those periods, 
such as the riots in the 1960s, receive no attention in the textbook.
C.  Post-1949 China-Hong Kong Relations
The last section of the chapter is “Hong Kong’s Contributions to China.”  The au-
thor states: “Under British rule, Hong Kong was closely tied to the mainland.  Howev-
er, the only contributions to China were the Anti-Qing movement and the war against 
Japan during 1937–41.” 35)  In regards to the Anti-Qing movement, the author argues 
that Hong Kong was a good place for the revolutionary movement led by Sun Yat-sen 
at the turn of the century because it was not under Qing rule and it gave the revolu-
tionaries a hiding place.  Here, “China” is associated with Sun’s revolutionary move-
ment, implying that the Qing government was clearly not “China.”  The representa-
tion of the Qing parallels that of Japan during World War II; both are foreigners 
invading “Chinese” territories.  Under the topic of “Anti-Japanese Effort, 1937–41,” the 
authors state, “Until Hong Kong fell to the Japanese in late 1941, local people helped 
Chinese refugees with food and shelter through local organizations.” 36)  The migrants 
from China are depicted as “refugees” who received help from “local people.”  The 
temporary status of “refugees” set these migrants from China apart from the “local 
people,” who are undeﬁned in the textbook.  This use of the term “refugees” who re-
ceived aid from Hong Kong also underlines the differences of these people from the 
immigrants since the 1950s because the latter were “productive” migrants with money 
or skills, which were conducive to the capitalistic development of the city.  In contrast, 
nothing about migrations to Hong Kong is noted in the Chinese History textbooks.
The second subsection, “China’s Contributions to Hong Kong,” has two topics: 
“Provision of things (including daily necessities and raw materials, and water),” and 
“Economic contributions.”  The economic contributions were the policies under Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reform [gaige kaifang ].  The special economic zones set up at that 
time attracted many industrialists to move their production lines to China and in-
creased the trade with China by a factor of twenty.  Following this subsection is a two-
page summary of the process of retrocession, which, like the description in Chinese 
History textbooks, concludes the history of Hong Kong.37)  The content does not in-
clude anything beyond the return of Hong Kong.  Nor does it give any details of Chi-
nese history in the 20th century.
Unlike the Chinese History textbooks, which downplay the importance of Hong 
Kong or include Hong Kong to help create a nationalistic past, the History textbook 
narrative emphasizes independent economic and social advancement in the twentieth 
century.  The post-war period is described as one of development and achievement of 
the local people.  The description implies that the success of Hong Kong is brought by 
British colonialism.  It does not cast any moral judgment on the British government. 
In both Chinese History and History textbooks, Hong Kong does not appear as a sub-
ject in its own right, but is either submerged into the Chinese nationalist narrative and 
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represents as the shame of colonialism, or is displayed as an example of triumphal 
capitalism brought by colonialism.
III.  Memories of History and Public Perception of the “Nation”
Although most secondary schools widely use the textbooks described above in his-
tory classes, they do not represent the general perception of China among Hong Kong 
residents who have received such education.  The following section is based on the re-
sults of a survey that I conducted between September 2006 and February 2007.  The 
survey focuses on three main themes: memories of history classes in secondary school, 
knowledge and attitudes of modern Chinese historical events, and feelings towards 
China and Hong Kong.  In total, I have collected over ﬁfty responses from different 
age groups.  The responses I include in this paper are from respondents who were 
born in 1970 or after.  All of them have received either all or part of their secondary 
education in Hong Kong.  I also conducted about ten email and in-person follow-up 
interviews.  Most of these respondents came from middle or upper class backgrounds 
and attended Anglo-Chinese secondary schools.
Across generations, respondents express the impression that the Chinese History 
subject is dry and requires heavy memorization of facts.  Compared to the subject of 
History, which a few questionnaire respondents describe as “fun and lively” or “inter-
esting,” Chinese History is generally regarded quite negatively, including comments 
such as “hard to understand” and “boring and unengaging.”
To most of the respondents who received secondary education before the mid-
1990s, Chinese History is associated with dynastic history and not with twentieth-cen-
tury history, because at that time in many of the junior levels the curriculum of Chi-
nese History ended either at May Fourth or World War II.  Many teachers did not 
teach it or went through it quickly.  In contrast, students currently in secondary school 
have a better understanding of historical events in the twentieth century, but the tur-
bulent decades after 1949 do not leave remarkable traces.  About half of the current 
Form 2 or Form 3 students said that modern Chinese history is chaotic and the leader-
ship in the PRC government until very recently has not been effective.
Although the Chinese History curriculum became increasingly nationalistic after 
1997, students’ perceptions of China disrupt the narratives of the textbooks, as ex-
posed in the gaps of their memories of the past and their understanding of their identi-
ty.  When asked how they see China, 90% of the respondents regardless of age said 
that China “still” has many problems even though it is improving.  Mostly the respon-
dents are very dissatisﬁed with corruption and bureaucratic red tape.  Others pointed 
out that there is a lack of democracy and unequal distribution of wealth.
Information gathered from the questionnaires and the interviews show that most re-
spondents see Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform as a very positive dramatic event. 
One respondent, a management executive of a soda company in Hong Kong said that 
she believes China has been moving from a closed-up ( fengbi ) nation to one open to 
international trade and inﬂuence.
The ones who attended secondary school in the 1980s generally view China’s situa-
tion as better than before.  When I asked them “better” in comparison to which peri-
od, most of them only vaguely answered “back then” or a few decades ago, indicating 
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a long period of stagnation and backwardness before Deng’s economic reforms.  What 
is ironic in their perceptions of China is that they strongly feel that economic disparity 
in China is a serious social problem, but they do not attribute the disparity to reform 
and unequal development towards capitalism under Deng.
A subtle difference is evident between people who were born in the 1970s and those 
born in 1990s.  The 1970s generation did not learn about China from secondary 
school history textbooks, which only brieﬂy mentioned post-1949 Chinese history. 
Many of them mainly learned about contemporary Chinese history from their rela-
tives who came from China, or through media reports and encounters with mainland-
ers in Hong Kong or China.  When I asked interviewees about the Cultural Revolu-
tion, while most respondents born in the mid-1980s or after can give a ballpark time 
frame of 1960s and 1970s, the ones who were born in the 1970s have blurred views. 
The soda company manager even said it was something that “happened a long time 
ago” and is not relevant to her.  The reluctance to comment on Maoism or policies 
under earlier periods of Communist China could be a result of ignorance and/or an 
overall indifference toward history.  One can also argue that there is a general amnesia 
about post-1949 Chinese history among Hong Kongers who were born in the 1970s or 
the 1980s, and the contents of the Chinese History and History textbooks helped per-
petuate this loss of memories.
The respondents born in the 1990s who have taken Chinese History tend to have 
better historical knowledge of post-1949 events, and one or two who are studying for 
the HKCEE can recite the years of major events.  However, according to an Anglo-
Chinese school history teacher whom I interviewed, the secondary students today also 
share a strong aversion towards Communism.  She said, “Although most of them can-
not explain what Communism means, they tend to see Communism as ‘outdated.’” A 
few respondents born in the 1990s also commented that they ﬁnd China backwards 
(luohou) and dirty.  Thus, even though these secondary school students have more 
knowledge about the PRC than the earlier generations, they still maintain a very 
strong local identity and an awareness of a different history and lifestyle the mainland. 
In contrast, according to that teacher, many of her students show great enthusiasm for 
the recent history of Hong Kong, such as the Hong Kong-Guangzhou strike in 1925–
26 and the riots in 1967. 38)  Unfortunately, these controversial topics are not included 
in any history textbooks.
Another frame of reference these respondents use to measure success is Hong 
Kong.  These younger generations living in Hong Kong continue to believe in Hong 
Kong’s superiority.  The inferior status of the nation/homeland induces Hong Kongers 
to desire a separate status from the PRC.  In other words, the alternative to colonial-
ism has never been desirable.  As Ackbar Abbas argues, Hong Kong has taken advan-
tage of its colonial status, turning itself into a global city and outstripping its homeland 
in ﬁnance and democratic politics.39)  Although there can be no denial that Hong 
Kongers generally enjoy greater bureaucratic efﬁciencies and material comforts than 
their mainland counterparts, underlying this view is an adoption of a Western model 
of capitalistic progressive narrative.  Many believe that Hong Kong is still ahead of 
China.  Although quite a number of respondents say that they do not think Hong 
Kong has a high status in the world anymore compared to twenty years ago, or its 
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high status now is just restricted to the economic sphere, they continue to think that 
Hong Kong is a cleaner, safer and more comfortable place than China.
Sense of Belonging
However, most Hong Kongers do have strong sentiments about being Chinese.  To 
the question “Do you consider yourself a subject of the PRC?,” most respondents re-
gardless of age acknowledge being Chinese, but a fair number of respondents qualify 
their answers by saying that it is a political fact, or reply that “we cannot say that we 
are not.”  But when asked whether they are patriotic, some say that they love Chinese 
civilization, history, culture and customs.  Many students also join study tours orga-
nized by their schools to visit cities in China.  Here, Chineseness is signiﬁed as mem-
bership in an ethnic group (minzu) or as culture, not as citizenship in a nation.  In a 
way, this echoes the idea of China represented in Chinese History textbooks pub-
lished before the 1990s, when the concept of the nation-state was not yet introduced 
and history was taught to cultivate students’ moral well being.  At the same time, be-
ginning in the 1990s, Hong Kongers began to cope with the gaps between their identi-
ty as Hong Kongers and as citizens of the PRC.  Rather than seeing Hong Kong iden-
tity as contradictory to the larger Chinese identity, they believe there is a way of 
merging these two identities, as Hong Kong scholar Lau Siu-kai argues, “It is also like-
ly that, despite all sorts of conﬂicts, the Hong Kong identity and the larger Chinese 
identity will become increasingly complementary inasmuch as claiming the Hong 
Kong identity not only does not involve denying one’s Chinese identity, but also acts 
to reinforce it.” 40)
Furthermore, we also see some subtle changes in the nationalistic feelings of the 
younger generations.  This is most evident in their reactions towards Diao Yu Tai.41) 
Respondents born in the 1970s generally see this as a contemporary territorial issue 
fought over by China, Taiwan and Japan, and remain neutral.  Several said that since 
it is mainly an issue about land claims, it is not as important as other World War II re-
lated issues such as the Yasukuni Shrine, the Nanjing Massacre or textbook falsiﬁca-
tion, which involve deaths and war crimes during the war.  In contrast, the 80% of the 
respondents born in the 1980s and 1990s view Diao Yu Tai as Chinese territory, de-
spite the fact that the sovereignty of the territory is still under dispute.  Secondary 
school students who responded to my questionnaire did not learn about Diao Yu Tai 
through textbooks, since neither History nor Chinese History textbooks mentioned 
the islands.  However, three of them elaborated and said that this is a matter damag-
ing the intactness of China, indicating their increased sense of national belongings and 
protectiveness of national territory.
While there have been anti-Japanese demonstrations throughout China in the past 
few years, the Chinese government is very cautious about responding to the protest-
ers.  When I was in Guangzhou in 2005 when widespread anti-Japanese demonstra-
tions took place throughout China, the authorities censored news from Hong Kong on 
these events, which were seen as potentially threatening to political stability.  For 
many students born in the 1990s, although they think that the emotions of most pro-
testors could have been toned down, they feel that their protests are justiﬁed and the 
government should act on the people’s behalf to negotiate with Japan.  Two of them 
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said that they were dissatisﬁed with the passivity of the mainland authorities on the is-
sue.  These students are more patriotic than the generations before them, but yet in 
more critical ways than the authorities expect them to be.
Another way of showing their concern for China is through helping China’s econo-
my.  Renita Wong shows that many Hong Kongers in their teens and twenties came to 
represent themselves as modern Chinese who were constructed as “free subjects” un-
der British colonial discourse of liberalism, and such discourse in turn has inspired 
many of them to engage in development projects of China after 1997, so that they can 
“open” it up from the outside.42)  She argues that China-development is a space in 
which individual Hong Kongers’ ambivalent desires about going ‘back’ and staying 
‘out’ were accommodated.  Their love for China is built upon their belief that China is 
an underdeveloped country while Hong Kong is a city in the First World.  Further-
more, identiﬁcation as “ﬁrst world” arises from pride in capitalistic development, con-
sonant with the narrative in the History textbook.  Nevertheless, they mix their local 
pride with a love for China, “othering” the homeland as backward and in need of 
help.  Overall, Hong Kongers’ “love” for China has increased in the past two decades, 
but their view towards the nation differs greatly from what the government or educa-
tion curriculum developers expect.
Conclusion
My essay has shown that in Hong Kong secondary schools, the history of China 
and Hong Kong is taught in two contradictory grand narratives, appearing in Chinese 
History textbooks and History textbooks respectively.  While the main themes of Chi-
nese History education have not changed much over the past twenty years, after retro-
cession more emphasis is put on learners’ identity as Chinese citizens rather than mor-
al cultivation.  History textbooks, in contrast, continue to endorse a Western capitalistic 
deﬁnition of progress, placing Hong Kong’s status above that of its homeland because 
of Hong Kong’s development under British colonialism.  As the result of the survey 
shows, however, even though secondary students today tend to have more nationalis-
tic attachments towards China and acknowledge their identity as Chinese, they are not 
passive recipients of history education.  Many ﬁnd alternative ways to demonstrate 
their love for the nation, as represented by their criticisms of the Chinese govern-
ment’s stands on the Diao Yu Tai incident, as well as their enthusiasm for develop-
ment programs in China.  This is both a result of the hybrid history education they re-
ceive in school, and of more access to information through a variety of channels 
beyond secondary school education.
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Suevey—history education (3-9-07)
My name is Angelina Chin, a teaching fellow at Pomona College, CA.  I am currently 
conducting a research on secondary school education and national identity in Hong 
Kong.  I need to collect 50 or more questionnaires from people who have attended 
secondary school in Hong Kong.  I sincerely hope that you could help my research by 
participating in this survey.  Thank you very much for your cooperation.  (All personal 
will be kept conﬁdential.)
我是陳欣欣，現時在美國加洲 Pomona College 任教。我正在進行一項關於香港中學
教育及國籍身分的研究，需要收集 50 份或以上的問卷回應。此問卷的對像是在香港
曾就讀過中學的人仕。希望你能參與此問卷調査。謝謝！（一切所提供之個人資料會
保密，只作研究員作參考）
For inquiries, please send email to:
如有任何査詢，請發電郵到以下地址：
angelina.chin@pomona.edu
Please answer the following questions:
請回答下列問題：
 1. Year of Birth (Choose 1)
  出生年代（選一）
  before 1935 1935–39 1940–44 1945–49 1950–54 1955–59 1960–64
   1965–69 1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–94
 2. What is your education level?
  你的教育程度是 ：中學（　）大專（　）大專以上（　）
 3. Where do you live now?
  你現在的居所在哪裡？
 4. Did you attend secondary school in Hong Kong?
  你曾在香港就讀中學嗎？
 5. Till which grade did you study in Hong Kong?
  在香港讀書至哪年級？
 6. Which secondary school did you attend?
  你就讀的是那一間中學？
 7. What type of school was that?  Did it have religious afﬁliation?  Was it public/pri-
vate?
  你就讀的中學有宗教背景嗎？是公立學校還是私立學校？
 8. Did you ever take “Chinese History” subject in secondary school?  Which grade?
  你有修讀「中國歷史」嗎？是哪一年級？
 9. Did you ever take “History” (taught in English)?  Which grade?
  你有修讀以英文教授的 “History”「歷史」嗎？是哪一年級？
 10. Do you remember what your “Chinese History” or “History” classes were like in 
secondary school?
  你對中學的「中國歷史」或「歷史」課程有甚麼印像？
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 11. Do you remember which “Chinese History” textbook did you use?
  你記得在中學「中國歷史」課是用哪本教科書嗎？
 12. Do you remember what you learned in secondary school “History” or “Chinese 
History” classes about 20th century China?
  你記得在中學「中國歷史」課或「歷史」課中所學過關於二十世紀中國的東西嗎？
 13. Do you remember what you learned in secondary school “History” or “Chinese 
History” classes about World War II?
  你記得在中學「中國歷史」課或「歷史」課中所學過關於第二次世界大戰的東
西嗎？
 14. Do you remember what you learned in secondary school “History” or “Chinese 
History” classes about Japan?
  你記得在中學「中國歷史」課或「歷史」課中所學過關於日本的東西嗎？
 15. Do you remember what you learned in secondary school “History” or “Chinese 
History” classes about Hong Kong?
  你記得在中學「中國歷史」課或「歷史」課中所學過關於香港的東西嗎？
 16. What is your deﬁnition of “patriotism”?
  你認為甚麼是「愛國」？
 17. Do you think your secondary school Chinese History teacher(s) was/were patriot-
ic?
  你覺得你的「中國歷史」科老師愛國嗎？
 18. Besides “History” or “Chinese History” class, where did you get your knowledge 
of history?
  在歷史課以外 ，你從甚麼地方獲得歷史知識？
 19. Do you think you have solid general knowledge of 20th century Chinese History? 
Why?
  你認為你對二十世紀的中國歷史有不錯的認識基礎嗎？為甚麼？
What is your impression or knowledge of the following issues?
你對以下的項目有何印像或認識？
 20. Yasukuni Shrine
  靖國神社
 21. Nanjing Massacre
  南京大屠殺
 22. Japanese Textbook  Revision
  日本教科書竄改
 23. Diao Yutai
  釣魚台
 24. Do you consider yourself Hong Konger?
  你覺得自己是香港人嗎？
 25. Do you consider yourself Chinese?
  你覺得自己是中國人嗎？
 26. Do you love China?
  你愛國嗎？
 27. Do you know of anyone close to you who is patriotic?  If yes, who is it?
  你身邊有愛國的朋友或親戚嗎？如有 ，是誰？
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 28. What’s your view of the mainland?
  你對中國大陸有何看法？
 29. What do you think about the Chinese Communist Party?
  你對中國共產黨有何看法？
 30. Do you support Taiwan independence?
  你支持台灣獨立嗎？
 31. Are you aware of the anti-Japanese protests in China?
  你有沒有留意在中國（大陸？）的一些反日示威行動？
 32. What do you think about those protests?  Do you agree with the protesters?
  你對那些行動有何看法？你認同他們的行動嗎？
 33. Do you consider Hong Kong as part of China?
  你覺得香港是（中國？）大陸的一部分嗎？
 34. Do you think Hong Kong plays an important role in the world?
  你覺得香港的國際地位高不高？
 35. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up in-depth interview?  (If yes, 
please leave your name and contact information.)
  你願意接受進一步的訪問嗎？（願意的話請留下姓名及連絡方法）
—END 問卷完—
